Hilson emphasizes enough the ways in which each country's political institutions shaped their labor movements. For example, in Britain the Labor party had to deal with fairly well-established liberal and conservative parties, while the Swedish SAP was the first modern, mass party in Sweden.)
That an explicit plea to combine cross-national and local research has to be made strikes a comparative political scientist as odd and troubling. While there is certainly a need for individual, country studies and local level analysis, there is simply no way a cross-national phenomenon like the rise and development of European labor movements can be understood without comparative, multilevel analysis. In the abstract, most labor historians recognize this, of course, but what Hilson seems to be calling for is more such work in practice. She also seems concerned that the trend toward ever more local analyses may have gone too far. While such studies have provided much more differentiated pictures of individual countries' political and social trajectories, this trend may also have contributed to an unnecessary narrowing of historians' focus. Hilson hopes Political Change and the Rise of Labour in Comparative Perspective will push the field back towards comparative, multi-level analysis and as a comparative political scientist interested in the history of the left I sincerely hope she succeeds.
Barnard College
Sheri Berman
War in Human Civilization. By Azar Gat (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. xv plus 822 pp. $35.00).
Azar Gat's newest book joins the recent scholarship attempting to explain the "riddle" of war. After writing books on military thought and the development of military strategy, Gat turns his eye toward the origins and fundamental nature of war itself. At the risk of boiling down a sophisticated argument too much, he agrees with Lawrence Keeley and others that war has been a fundamental aspect of human behavior almost since the appearance of humans. Gat contends that war has been a function of humanity's adaptive, evolutionary growth over time.
In effect, humans have fought wars because winning wars has produced real, tangible gains (most notably access to food and sex for reproduction) for the victors that were worth the costs associated with it. The best summary of this thesis can be found in chapter five. Gat begins his argument in pre-historic times and seems more comfortable when discussing the Greeks and Romans than when discussing the wars of the twentieth century. His chronology avoids the trap that some historians (including, I admit, myself) sometimes fall into of devoting disproportionate time to the more modern periods because of the much richer source bases. Thus halfway into the book, he has only just begun to discuss the development of sedentary civilization. This refreshing willingness to eschew the modern is a welcome facet of the book's structure.
When Gat moves on to the development of states, he argues that state formation did not increase war's frequency or its lethality. By contrast, states helped to journal of social history spring 2008 reduce the raids and constant inter-tribal warfare that had inflicted tremendous damage on small farming societies. Groups like the Mongols and the Huns were able to do so much damage and wreak such havoc as they did because they did not have settled farming areas of their own to protect. States provided protection from such marauders and therefore reduced the overall level of war-related violence, even if the wars states prosecuted with their new resources could be bloodier and lengthier than tribal raids. War in the age of states thus became less common and less normative. In the modern, post-Enlightenment era war came to be regarded as an aberrance in liberal societies, "something utterly repugnant and futile, indeed, incomprehensible to the point of absurdity" (662). While one can take issue with that assumption, the linking of liberal thought and the subject of war forms one of the strongest parts of the book. Along these lines, Gat also adds a caution about accepting the widely-held belief that liberal societies do not go to war against one another.
Gat draws on a wide variety of disciplines to shape his arguments. This interdisciplinary approach is at once a strength and a weakness of the book. His breadth of coverage is impressive, using fields as far flung as archaeology, international relations, and ethology. Historians, whom he does not seem to hold in terribly high regard as a group, feature as only one of many influences. He places a great deal (perhaps too much) reliance on animal behaviorists, extending their arguments into the human realm. He even makes an evolutionary comparison between the human need to fight wars and a tree's need to develop a trunk, a comparison that I for one do not find terribly enlightening. This far-flung approach, although used by other books of similar scope and magnitude, is problematic, as it robs humans of some of the central agency that historians take for granted. Gat does not argue for biological determinism, but his central thesis implies more of a biological element for explanations of war than most historians would be willing to accept.
Large sections of the book do not deal with war much at all. Gat digresses into lengthy discussions of the development of market economies, state-based political systems, communications technologies, and liberal thought. These tangents are not always directly connected back to the main subject of war, although they are always well grounded and well researched. Along the way, Gat takes aim at a number of theories, some of them already outmoded and others still fashionable. In particular, he criticizes the imagined communities thesis of Benedict Anderson, arguing that nations are nothing more than developed kin networks of the kinds that had fueled wars for centuries. More curiously, in chapter eleven, he seems to try to rehabilitate the argument of Victor Davis Hanson and others that distinctive "eastern" and "western" ways of war developed. Not only have historians like John Lynn worked hard to debunk this simple dichotomy, but the idea itself seems to run counter to his arguments about the role of biology and cultural evolution.
The book is unsuited for course use for several reasons, most notably its size and the high level of its analysis. It is not a general introduction to the subject nor would it cover the kinds of subjects undergraduates would need. In many ways, the book works best as a comparative, world history study of the development of warfare across civilization centers and through several major time periods. Methodologically, it does not have much directly in common with social history, although the comparative and interdisciplinary approaches will be familiar to social historians.
In sum, War in Human Civilization is indeed the ambitious, sweeping book that the author set out to write. Both its scope and scale are impressive as is the wide range of sources and disciplines whose theories and methods are brought to bear on the "riddle" of war. Historians (especially social historians) may not be fully comfortable with all of the approaches the book uses, nor will they agree with all of the conclusions reached. Nevertheless, the coverage and the deft weaving together of so many central theories on human behavior make this a book worth examining.
University of Southern Mississippi
Michael S. Neiberg With its broad focus, simultaneous publication in hardback and paperback, and inclusion of illustrations, one might think on first picking up this book that it is a survey of what is known about women and work in England, 1300-1620, intended for a student audience. However, it is much more than this, while also not quite filling that particular niche. The book is based on a lot of new research, chiefly on equity court petitions for the period 1470-1619 and micro-historical studies of five market centres predominantly for the period c. 1280-c.1570 . The former enable McIntosh to discuss areas that have not had much attention paid to them before, such as women's involvement in keeping lodging houses and pawning goods, and to include vivid stories about individual women's working lives. The latter allow her to enter the debate about when and why women were pushed out of the brewing trade, as well as to compare this form of work with women's role in the food trades. McIntosh's focus, then, is on paid work and thus on urban life, although there are occasional comparative asides to rural examples. The book is divided into three parts. The first is her introductory section, which sets out to place women's work in its social setting (Chapter 1), before discussing the source material, the historiographical arguments, and her own thesis about continuity and change over the period 1300-1620 (Chapter 2). McIntosh thus intends her study to contribute to the lively debate about whether women's working lives saw a marked improved after the Black Death until around 1500 (P.J.P. Goldberg and Caroline Barron) or whether patriarchal assumptions about
SECTION 2 GENDER AND VIOLENCE

